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STANDARD OF REVIEW

Cathy Code asserts throughout her brief that the trial court's ruling holding Skip·
Wing personally liable should be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard or even.
for clear error. But the trial court's determination that Skip was personally involved and
therefore personally liable was based on the court's erroneous interpretation and
application of Utah Code·§ 78B-5-826 and corresponding case law. Br. of Appellant, 812. Thus the trial court's ruling is reviewed for correctness, not an abuse of discretion: "A
district court's interpretation of relevant statutory provisions is reviewed for correctness,
giving no deference to the district court's decision." 2 Ton Plumbing, L.L.C. v.

Thorgaard, 2015 UT 29, ,r 17,345 P.3d 675 (internal quotation and citations omitted).
REPLY ARGUMENT

Skip Wing could not have su~d Cathy Code in his personal capacity, even ifhe
wanted to. Under basic contract law, Sk~p cannot sue to enforce a contract to which he is
not a party and in which he has no interest. Under the principal broker statute, Skip could
not sue in his individual capacity, but only in his capacity as a principal broker. If Skip
could not be and was not involved in this case.personally, he legally cannot be subject to
personal liability. As a result, the court's ruling holding Skip personally liable must be
reversed. Cathy fails to show otherwise.

I.

The Brokerage's appeal does not fail on threshold grounds.
In its Opening Brief, the Brokerage argued that the plaintiff Skip Wing is involved

in this case as a representative only and therefore it is inappropriate as a matter of law to
hold him personally liable for an award of attorney fees. Skip never asserted that he was a
1

party to the contract and never sought to enforce it on his own behalf. Skip will not and
legally cannot benefit personally froin the contract, and therefore cannot be held
personally liable under that contract.
. In response, the Appellee Cathy Code asserts that the Brokerage's appeal fails on
threshold grounds, for three reasons. First, Cathy argues that the Brokerage did not
preserve two of its arguments on appeal: 1) that a representative litigant cannot be liable
vJ

for attorney fees; and 2) that the trial court found-that Skip was· only a representative and

not personally involved in the litigation. Br. of Appellee, 25-26. Second, Cathy asserts
~

that if any error occurred, the Brokerage invited that error. Id Finally, Cathy asserts that
the Brokerage failed to challenge the trial court's alternative grounds for holding Skip
personally liable. Id. at 27. Each argument lacks merit.

A.

The Brokerage preserved its arguments.

Cathy argues that the Brokerage did not preserve its representative-capacity
arguments for two reasons: 1) the Brokerage did not raise these arguments until after
judgment; and 2) the Brokerage did not move the court for a ruling that the court,s
amended findings affected Skip, s status as a judgment creditor. Br. of Appellee, 26; 3435

J. The timing of the Rule 59 Motion is immaterial.
Concemi~g Cathy's first assertion, it is true that the Brokerage first argued that
Skip should not be personally liable in a Rule 59 motion that arose after trial and after an
initial ruling on attorney fees. Cathy argues that the Brokerage should have raised.its
argument in the initial arguments on attorney fees. Br. of Appellee, 34. But those
2

arguments concerned only whether Cathy was a prevailing party; whether Skip should be
held p~rsonally liable was not addressed by any party. R. at 5977-85; 6331-48; 6431-38.

If the Brokerage had prevailed in that argument, the question of Skip's personal liability
would have been immaterial.
Once the trial court ruled that Cathy was a prevailing party and was entitled to
attorney ~ees, Skip's personal liability then became relevant. The court's ruling provided
no guidance on this issue. As a result,--determining Skip's status was the natural next step
in resolving the attorney-fees question and the Brokerage accordingly filed its Rule 59
motion seeking clarification.
In any event, the Brokerage did everything necessary to preserve these arguments,
even if Cathy believes the Brokerage could have raised them earlier. An issue is
preserved where it is presented to the court "in such a way that the trial court has an
opportunity to rule on it." L.G. v. State, 2015 UT 41, 19, 353 P.3d 131 (quoting In re
Adoption ofBaby E.Z., 2011 UT 38,125,266 P.3d 702); see also Burdickv. Horner
Townsend & Kent, Inc., 2015 UT 8, 150, 345 P.3d 531 (holding that arguments against

summary judgment were preserved where the arguments were raised for the first time
after trial in a motion to reconsider).
This analysis does not consider, as Cathy asserts, whether the issues in the Rule 59
motion should have been raised earlier; it requires only that the issues were raised and
considered and that the trial court had an opportunity to rule. And there is no dispute that
the Rule 59 motion was fully briefed and the court issued a ruling. Thus the Brokerage
preserved this argument.
3

2. The court's written order is not limited to Skip's status as ajudgment
creditor.
Cathy's second assertion is that the Brokerage did not preserve its arguments
because it did not move the court for a ruling that the court's amended findings affected
Skip's status as a judgment creditor. Br. of Appellee, 26, 34-35. In other words, Cathy
asserts that even though the trial court found that Skip was involved in the case as a
~

representative only, this fact cannot affect Skip's status as a judgment debtor because the
••••• ~~'!'·...

Brokerage never filed a motion requesting this relief. But Cathy relies erroneously on the
trial court's oral ruling and ignores the content of the written order.
Cathy erroneously relies on the oral ruling because the written order controls and
does not limit the scope of the court's amended findings. When a court's oral ruling
differs from a final written order, the written order controls. MF v. JF., 2013 UT App.
247, 16, 312 P.3d 946.
In this case, Cathy correctly points out that the trial court stated in an oral ruling
that the court was not ruling on Skip's· status as a judgment debtor. Br. of Appellee, 2223. But the written order contains no such limitations-it simply states that wherever
Skip_ is identified in litigation, that identification refers to Skip as an agent or
representative. R. at 8246-4 7. It also clarifies that Skip in his individual capacity did not
~.

have or bring any claims in this case. Id. Nowhere does the written order state that the
clarification regarding Skip's role was limited to his status as a judgment creditor.
Moreover, the written order does not incorporate the court's oral ruling. R. at
8234-49. Had the trial court wished to incorporate the oral ruling into the final, written
4

:::

order, it would have done so. Because it did not, under the written order each and every
reference to Skip is a reference to Skip as an agent or representative only. This includes
references that might establish Skip as a judgment debtor.
·cathy cannot complain about this result now. If Cathy believed that the written
. order did not accurately reflect the judge's oral ruling, Cathy was required to object
within seven days of service of the propose.d written order. Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2). The
other defendants duly filed their objections. R. at 8199-25~ In contrast, Cathy chose not
to object, perhaps believing that her objection to a previous proposed order on the same
motion sufficed. See Section l(A)(3), infra. ·
To summarize, Cathy did not object to the proposed written order, the written
order addresses all references to Skip-without limitation-and the written order trumps
the oral ruling. As a result, Cathy cannot rely on limitations that the written order simply
does not contain. The written order amended all references to Skip to clarify that he had
no personal involvement in this case. And not only does the written_ order trump the oral
ruling, but the issue of Skip's debtor status was addressed more fully than Cathy
suggests.
3. Both the Brokerage and Cathy argued below whether Skip should be a

judgment debtor.
On August 5, 2014, the defendant Chuck Schvaneveldt filed a motion under Rule
52 asking the court to amend certain findings in its final judgment. R. at 7088-90. One
month later, Chuck filed a corresponding proposed order, which included a request that
the court clarify that Skip was not a judgment creditor. R. at 7423-25. The Brokerage
5

·-·

~

· filed a memorandum opposing the proposed order, arguing that the court should clarify
not only that Skip was not a judgment.creditor, but also that Skip was not a judgment
debtor. R. at 7538-41. Understanding that her interests may be affected, Cathy filed a
memorandum responding to the Brokerage, asserting that Skip should remain as a
judgment debtor. R. at 7553-58.
Thus the issue of Skip's judgment status was fully briefed to the court in
conne_ction with the. Rule 52 motion. Presumably the· court relied on all arguments that ,..
had been presented when the court issued its written order. And that written order
vJ

amended Skip's judgment status-without limiting the amendment to Skip's status as a
judgment creditor.
B.

The Brokerage did not invite the trial court's error.

Cathy next asserts that if the trial court erred regarding Skip's status as a judgment
debtor, the Brokerage invited the error. Cathy goes to great lengths to point out
statements by counsel that Skip was a party to this litigation. Br. of Appellee, 11-17, 26.
Cathy argues that these repeated references to Skip mean that he was involved in the case
;.;)

· -in an individual capacity, not as a representative; by making these references, counsel
. invited the court's error in its initial finding that Skip was involved in litigation in his
personal capacity. Br. of Appellee, 25-26. But Cathy's reliance on these out-of-context
references fails. These references, when viewed in the context of the entire caseincluding multiple clarifications through all stages of litigation-show that references to
Skip were references to Skip as a representative.

6
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I. Referring to a party without indicating the party's representative status in
each and every reference is a routine practice; it does 11.ot establish
personal involvement in this case.
·
Cathy's analysis ignores the reality that representatives in litigation are nearly
always referred to without in~icating their representative capacity. As just one example,
in Angel Investors, LLC v. Garrity, 2009 UT 40, 1 16, 216 P.3 d 944 (cited in the
Brokerage's Opening Brief) a company (Angel Investors, LLC) sued on behalf of another
company.(XanGo LLC). Throughout that opinion the Utah Supreme Court refers~to the
plaintiff as "Angel Investors," not "Angel Investors, LLC on be~alf of XanGo LLC.,, The
shorthand reference to "Angel Investors" does not change the fact that the company was
suing in a representative capacity.
The same applies here. Counsel can _refer to Skip without pointing out, each and
every time, that Skip was involved as a representative only. Under Cathy's theory, every
time Skip came up counsel was required to refer to him as "Skip Wing solely as a
representative of Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation and Elite Legacy Corporation."
This dramatic approach was unnecessary because Skip made his representative nature
clear from the outset of his involvement in this case.
Evidence abounds throughout the record that counsel used "Skip" as a shorthand
reference for Skip's employers Aspenwood and Elite Legacy because Skip was merely
representjng those entities. Even within Cathy's record citations, the parties refer to Skip
and Remax Elite interchangeably: "I get the fdea that Skip Wing only has a $10,000 stake
in this, that Remax Elite only has a $10,000 stake in this ...." Br. of Appellee, 14. Such
references clarify that Remax Elite (i.e., Aspenwood Real Estate and Elite Legacy) is the
7

true plaintiff in this case and Skip is only a representative.
This understanding is. bolstered by evidence in the record contradicting Cathy's

claim that Skip will receive $10,000 from the proceeds of this case. One example of such
evidence is the Assignment of Claim Agreement beh.1/een Remax Elite and Tim Shea.
This Agreement, which gave rise to much dispute in the lower court, shows that
Aspenwood and Elite Legacy-not Skip-would receive the $10,000. E.g., R. at 1425~

26, .1704-05, 1889, 8450, pp. 106:9-108:16.

· · · . ····'•

In the Assignment Agreement, "Remax Elite" agreed to assign its interest in the
FSBO commission claim to Tim Shea. R. at 5839-42. Two parties signed the
Assignment: Remax Elite and Tim Shea. R. at 5842. The Assignment refers to "Remax"
as the broker involved in the failed property sale. R. at 583 9. It acknowledges that under
Utah law only Remax may pursue Tim Shea's commission. R. at 5840. Remax agrees to
assign the commission claim to Tim and to allow Tim to pursue the lawsuit in Remax's
name. R. at 5840. In exchange, Tim agrees to pay Remax-not Skip Wing-$10,000

from any funds received through the lawsuit. R. at 5840. Skip signed the Assignment, but
~

clearly indicated that he was signing on behalf of the company by including "REMAX

ELITE" above his signature line and listing his office with the company (Broker) below
his signature line. R. at 5842.
Under this Assignment Agreement, it is unclear whether Skip will ever receive a
personal benefit from this litigation. Any funds recovered will go to Remax Elite, i.e.,
Aspenwood or Elite Legacy, and those funds may or may not trickle down to Skip.
Counsel for the Brokerage made this very clear to the court in a pretrial hearing: "Skip
8

Wing's going to get hardly anything out of this, there were several partners in the
brokerage and they're going to get the first $10,000 and he's going to get his portion of
the $10,000." Rat 8450; p. 104:3-6. Indeed, the most likely result is thatAspenwood
and Elite Legacy will pay the entire $10,000 toward Cathy's substantial attorney-fee
award, leaving both Skip and his partners nothing. 1
In addition to the Assignment Agreement, other evidence abounds that counsel's
'-

.....·.. references to "Skip" were all references to Skip as a representative.The Brokerage
already cited several examples of both deposition and trial testimony showing t~at
everyone understood that Skip was acting only as a representative. Br. of Appellant, 1315. Similar examples are found throughout the record. E.g., 1704, 1777-82, 2326,"3591
(identifying Skip in caption as "Hilary Owen 'Skip' Wing,principal broker, D!BIA as
Remax Elite")(emphasis added), 8450, pp. 103 :8-104:9 (In a pretrial hearing: "We're
coming in here and asking that Skip Wing as the broker, not personally, once again,
we're splitting hairs, be awarded the commission and his attorney's fee ....")(emphasis
added), 124:16-18 (The Court: "Skip's going to get, what, the first $10,000?" Mr.
Duncan: "The brokerage will and he'll get a portion of that, yes.").
Indeed, this was the very purpose of the trial court's "clarification" in its order on
the Rule 52 motion. i.e., "to avoid any conclusion that the claims that are identified are

1 All

parties in this case have referred to Aspenwood and Elite Legacy as "defunct.'' M~re
accurately, Aspenwood and Elite Legacy no longer conduct business, but continue to
maintain this lawsuit and thus continue their winding up phase and still exist as legal
entities.
9

individually and separately owned by Mr. Wing, independent of his role in connection
with the business entity.,, R. at 824 7. In other words, to avoid the very conclusion that
Cathy now asserts on appeal.

In sum, by amending its findings the court ensured that Skip would not be held
personally liable simply because counsel used "Skip" as shorthand for "Skip Wing solely
in his capacity as a representativ~ of Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation and Elite
Legacy Corporation." This routine, unremarkable practice of referring to a representative
without indicating representative capacity is applied nearly universally by both litigants·
~

and courts. Doing so here did not invite the court's error.

2. Even if counsel initially invited the error, the court has already corrected
the error.
\¥hen Cathy argues that the Brokerage invited the trial court's errors, presumably
Cathy is referring to the court's ruling regarding Skip adding himself personally as a
plaintiff and Skip claiming that he was a party to the FSBO. R. at 7009-11.
Cathy ignores that the trial court has already amended the erroneous findings that
the Brokerage supposedly invited. In its Rule 52. order, the court amended all past
findings and clarified that references to Skip Wing were not references to him in his
individual capacity. R. at 8246-47. In the court's own words, each and every reference to
v8

Skip was "a representation of his role in connection with the business entity, and that ...
role was the role of principal broker, representative, agent, or authorized representative of
the brokerage." R. at 824 7.

Accordingly, Skip pursued an award of attorney fees as a "representative, agent, or
10

authorized representative of the brokerage,,-not "individually and separately ...
independent of [Skip's] role in connection with the business identity." Id. If Skip asserted

- -Q

a claim for attorney fees, or any other claim, that "does not represent his individual and
personal ownership of those claims" and Skip "did not individually own or control the
rights that were being asserted in the litigation." R. at 8246-4 7.
Thus this Court_ does not need to reverse trial court's finding that Skip Wing
asserted a breach of contract claim personally .. The triaL court has already amended its
own findings to clarify that Skip was not involved personally in any way. Accordingly,
the Brokerage need not challenge the trial court's amended findings where those findings
already support the Brokerage on appe_al.

C.

The Brokerage challenged all grounds on which the trial court r_elied.

Cathy asserts that the Brokerage failed to challenge the trial court's alternative
grounds for holding Skip personally liable. Br. of Appellee, 27. Cathy points out four
alternative grounds:
1. A finding that all three plaintiffs attempted to enforce the FSBO. Br. of Appellee,
18, 27.
2. A ruling that because the Brokerage referred to Aspenwood, Elite Legacy, and
Skip as a group, and because the group tried to enforce the FSBO, Skip tried to
enforce the FSBO. Br. of Appellee, 17-18.
3. A ruling that Skip was liable for attorney fees under Utah's reciprocal fee statute.
Br. of Appellee, 18-19.
4. A conclusion that Skip cannot claim the benefits of the FSBO while avoiding its

consequences. Br. of Appellee, 20.
The Brokerage has challenged all four grounds. The first two grounds do not

11

C.

\,i;j;,11

require reversal because the court has already corrected its errors regarding findings. R. at
8246-47. But in any event, the Brokerage has challenged these two grounds by arguing
that Skip never.attempted to enforce the FSBO. Br. of Appellant, 7-16. And the
~

Brokerage challenged the last two grounds by arguing that Skip was not liable under the_

reciprocal-fee statute and that where Skip cannot benefit from the FSBO he should not
have to bear its consequences. Br. of Appellant, 7-12, 17-21. As a result, Cathy's
alternative-grounds argument is unpersuasive ...•.....
II.

Cathy interprets the reciprocal-fee statute and corresponding. cases
incorrectly.
A.

Summary of Primary and Responsive Arguments.

The Brokerage first argued that the district court erred as a matter of law in
awarding Cathy an award of attorney fees against Skip personally. The trial court
awarded the attorney fees under a contract to which Skip was not a party. Skip never
~

claimed to be a party to the contract and never sought to be recognized as a party to the
contract. And no claim in this case required Skip to be a party to the contract. Under Utah

law, Skip cannot be held liable under a contractual attorney-fee provision where Skip is
not even a party to the contract.

In response, Cathy argued that the trial court found that Skip had asserted that he
was a party to the contract, that this finding is dispositive, and that the finding may be
reversed only if the finding represents clear error. Br. of Appellee, 27-29. Cathy also
argued that Skip attempted to enforce the contract and is therefore liable under the
contract as a matter oflaw. Br. of Appellee, 30-33.

12

B.

The trial court found that Skip did not assert that he, in his personal
capacity, was a party to the contract.

Once again, Cathy ignores that the trial court amended its findings to clarify that
Skip Wing was not involved in this lawsuit individually. See Section I, Parts A(2) and
B(2), supra.

Cathy asserts and relies repeatedly on her claim that Skip sought and received an
award ~f attorney fees under the FSBO, that he was distinct from the other plaintiffs, that
-

....... '

he had a personal stake in the case, and so on. Br. of Appellee, 2-A, 11-17, 24-29. But
the trial court expressly ruled-without qualification-that Skip did not own any claims
personally, pursue any claims personally, or identify himself as a plaintiff personally. R.
at 8246-4 7. Skip individually is not a judgment creditor and likewise cannot be a.
judgment debtor.
In short, under the court's amended findings, Aspenwood, Elite Legacy, and
Skip-as a representative of Aspenwood and Elite Legacy only-asserted a breach of
co1:1-tract claim against Cathy. The same appli~s to the Brokerage's pursuit of attorney

fees_: Skip did not seek or receive attorney fees under the FSBO in his personal capacity.
As a result, contrary to Cathy's claims (Br. of Appellee, 28-29), the trial court found that
Skip did not assert any claims in his individual capacity.

C.

Cathy ignores the requirement in Hooban that a party be either a
contracting party or attempt to insert itself as a contracting party.

Cathy next attempts to argue that Skip is personally liable under Utah's reciprocal
fee statute and cases examining that statute. But Cathy oversimplifies the legal rule
established in Hoo ban v. Unicity Int' I, Inc., 2012 UT 40, 285 P .3d 766 and ignores that
13

Q

case's factual background.
Cathy attempts to reduce Hooban to a simplistic syllogism:
• If litigation is based on a contract and the contract allows one party to
recover attorney fees, then any party to the litigation may be liable for
attorney fees.
0 .

The litigation here was based on a contract and the contract contained an
attorney fee provision.

• Therefore Skip, a party to the litigation, may be liable for attorney fees.
Br. of Appellee, 30-32. This syllogism ignores the requirement in Hooban that~ litigant
be a party to the contract, or at least attempt to establish itself as a party to the contract.
In Hooban, Mr. Hooban attempted to establish that he was legally a party to a
contract even though he was not an original signatory. Hooban, 2012 UT 40, 1~ 4-5.·
After the court determined that he was not a party to the contract, he claimed that as a
stranger to the contract he should not be liable unde~ its attorney-fee provision. Id.,~ 23.
In response, the Utah Supreme Court did not, as Cathy suggests, discard
established contract law providing that only parties to a contract may be bound by that
contract. Instead, the Court asked a simple hypothetical question: IfMr. Hooban had
prevailed, would he have been a party to the contract? The answer was yes, and therefore
the Court applied the reciprocal-fee statute to Mr. Hooban: "[The Defendant.] is entitled
to fees because it was the prevailing party and because Hoo ban would have been a party
to the contract ifhe had prevailed in this suit." Id., 115. In addition, the Court stated that
~

"had Hoobai:i prevailed in this suit, he would have been a party to the contract upon
which the suit is based and would have been contractually entitled to attorney fees.'' Id,~
14

32; see also Anglin v. Contractor Fabrication Machining, 2001 UT App 341, 37 PJd 267
(holding that the reciprocal~fee statute applies to parties to a contract only, not to any
party in the litigation).
Under this analysis established in Hooban, courts ask two questions to determine
whether 8:Il unsuccessful litigant is liable under a contractual attomey-fee provision: Is the
litigant a party to the contract? If not, would the litigant have been a pa~y to the contract

if the litigant prevailed? If the answer to either question is yes, the litigant will be held
liable. If the litigant was not a party to the contract and would not become a party by
prevailing, the litigant cannot be liable.
In this case, Skip was not a party to the contract and-unlike :Mr. Hooban-would
not become a party to the contract by prevailing. Skip never asked the court to insert his
name into the contract, to recognize him as a successor in interest to a contracting party,
or to otherwise award him individually any benefit from the contract. Instead, Skip-as a
representative only-asserted the FSBO's enforceability as a basis for Remax Elite's
recovery, not his own recovery. Skip Wing as an individual was simply not a party to the
contract and never sought any recovery for himself.
Of course, even if Skip was involved in this lawsuit personally, he did not assertas I\1r. Hooban did-that he was personally a party to the contract. Instead, Skip asserted
that his brokerage was a party to the contract. Accordingly, Skip is not liable under the
FSBO.
Cathy disagrees, and asserts that the Brokerage's interpretation of Hooban would
render the FSBO's attorney-fee provision meaningless. We fail to see how this is the
15
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case. All parties acknowledge that Remax Elite (i.e., Aspenwood and Elite Legacy) was a
party to the FSBO. Remax Elite attempted to enforce the FSBO against Cathy. Cathy
prevailed. As a result, Cathy is entitled to an award of attorney fees against Remax Elite .
..d)

Her position is no different than any other prevailing party would be, including the
prevailing party in Hooban. Moreover, Cathy's suggestion that Skip is the only party
capable of satisfying the judgment (Br. of Appellee, 33) is inaccurate; Remax Elite has a
judgment against another defendant in this case that far exceeds Cathy's. Br. of ..
Appellant, 4. While thatjudgment is being challenged on appeal, it would be incorrect to
state that Remax Elite lacks the assets to satisfy Cathy's judgment.
To summarize, basic contract law does not allow Skip to be held liable under the
FSBO because he was not a party to the FSBO. And unlike Jvfr. Hooban, Skip would no~
become a party to the FSBO by prevailing against Cathy. As a stranger to the FSBO and
only a representative of the FSBO parties, Skip cannot be personally liable under the
FSBO.

III.

Cathy's unsupported argument regarding representatives' personal liability
fails.
A.

Summary of Primary and Responsive Arguments.

The Brokerage next argued that Skip was involved in the litigation as a
representative of Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation and Elite Legacy Corporation.
Litigants often maintain judicial proceedings as representatives, in which the
representatives do not personally receive the benefit of a judgment and do not personally
face liability. The trial court expressly found that Skip was involved as a representative
16
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only. R. at 8246-47. That finding is supported by the record. This finding reflects Utah's
preference for substance over fonn.
In response, Cathy argued that Skip did not preserve this issue, that the trial
court's findings regarding Skip's representative capacity did not apply to Cathy, and that
Skip is personally liable because he voluntarily added himself as a plaintiff-even ifhe
did so as a representative only. Br. of Appellee, 33-37.
B.

.,.The Brokerage preserved this argument.

_

..........,

.·

Cathy argues that the Brokerage did not preserve its representative-capacity
argument because the Brokerage did not raise it while the parties were arguing about
attorney fees. Br. of Appellee; 34. The Brokerage did everything it had to do to preserve
this argument. See Section I, Part A(l), supra. The argument was fully briefed by all

,,.,
\/iW

parties, raised in oral argument, and ruled on as a matter of law by the court. Thus the

Brokerage preserved the representative-capacity argument.
C.

Representative litigants are not personally liable for judgments or
attorney fees.

Cathy argues-without a single citation to legal authority-that representative
litigants are personally liable for fees, but may be indemnified by the party they are
representing. Br. of Appellee, 35-37. This directly contradicts the case law cited in the
Brokerage's Opening Brief: "[T]rustees being sued in their representative capacities are
~ot personally liable for any judgment or attorney fees resulting from such litigation ...

." Fisher v. Fisher, 2009 UT App 305, fl 20,221 P.3d 845 (emphasis in original) (internal

citation omitted); see also Dunn v. Wallingford, 155 P. 347,351 (Utah 1916) ("The
17

reason that an administrator becomes personally liable is because he is without authority
to act in a representative capacity, and can only act in a personal capacity.").
Like the trustee in Fisher, Skip is acting in a representative capacity only. As a
~

result, Skip is "not personally liable for any judgment or attorney fees resulting from such
litigation." Fisher, 2009 UT App 305,120. Cat?y's contrary assertion that representative
litigants face personal liability is legally incorrect.
IV.

·Cathy claims incorrectly that Skip will personally benefit .from this lawsuit.

A.

Summair of Primary and Responsive Arguments.

The Brokerage argued that Skip cann~t be held personally liable under a contract

where he will receive no benefit from the contract. In addition, the Brokerage asserted
that as a matter of public policy the law cannot hold a principal broker personally liable
for attorney fees.
In response, Cathy argued that the Skip will in fact receive a benefit from the
lawsuit and that the Brokerage's policy concerns are without merit. Br. of Appellee, 373 8. Cathy failed to respond to the Brokerage's argument that if Skip cannot benefit from
~

the FSBO then he should not bear its burdens.
B.

Skip will not benefit from this lawsuit personally.
'

'

Cathy's argument that Skip will benefit from this lawsuit personally continues her
pattern of ignoring the trial court's ruling that Skip is not asserting any claims personally.
Br. of Appellee, 25-26, 28-29, 33-35, 37-38. Cathy's assertion that Skip is personally
entitled to $10,000 of any recovery is factually incorrect and ignores a key ruling from
the court.
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An issue that received much attention in the lmver court was whether a brokerage
could qualify as a principal broker. E.g., R. at 1412-29, 1476-77, 1498-1503, 1773-80 .
. After extensive argument, the court ruled that Remax Elite (meaning the brokerage with
which Tim Shea was associated), which at the time was the only named plaintiff, had
standing under the principal-broker statute. R. at 1886-88. In its ruling, the court held
that standing existed without adding Skip Wing personally as a plaintiff:

..... •· ·,.:. . [T]his Court concludes that the law allows a brokerage.to maintain- an
action to recover a real estate commission in its own name, so long as the
brokerage-a real estate company-had affiliated with it an individual who
was licensed as a principal broker at the time of the transaction at issue ....
Because ReMax had a licensed principal broker affiliated with it at
the time of the transaction at issue, ReMax may bring and maintain an
action to recover the commission. The fact that Skip Wing is apparently no
longer affiliated with ReMax does not divest ReMax of standing.
R. at 1888.
With this ruling in hand, it would not make sense to add Skip Wing as a plaintiff
personally-the standing question was already resolved in Remax Elite's favor. What
would make sense is bringing a swift end to the defendants' incessant filings arguing that
Remax Elite, as nothing more than a dba designation, could not maintain a_ lawsuit.
Remax chose to do this by amending its pleadings to clarify the entity underlying the
Remax Elite name.
As the Brokerage pointed out in its opening brief, the Defendants filed numerous
documents asserting that "Remax Elite," as nothing more than a name, could not
maintain a lawsuit. Br. of Appellant, 3-4. In her responding brief, Cathy ignores the
procedural nightmare she and the other defend ants created out of this issue and how her
19

actions led to amending the Complaint to list Skip as a plaintiff. It is no exaggeration that
the "defunct dba" argument stalled this case for years.
The "defunct dba" argument first appeared in June, 2009. Br. of AppeUant, 3; R. at
931. Over the next roughly two years, the Defendants raised this argument at least 20
times. Br. of Appellant, 3-4; R. at 1196-1208; 1256-83; 1303-25; 1373-85; 1407-62;

1493-504; 1615-39; 1699-714; 1715-25;2068-104;2120-36;2173-89;2289-98;
-·· ;:.: ..·..

2306-14; 2400-3; 2548-53; 2614-22; 2645-52; 2653-60; 33.64:~93.

This pattern was particularly objectionable because approximately half of these
~

filings came after the trial court ruled against the Defendants on these issues. Br. of
Appellant, 4. The court was likely referring to this uncalled-for procedural logjam when
it described a post..trial motion as "precisely the type of cumulative and unnessary [sic]
motion that justified the significant attorney fees in this case, and caused this case to
languish on the court's docket for years." R. at 7012.
Thus, Remax Elite amended its pleadings not to add Skip as a new plaintiff, as
Cathy asserts (Br. of Appellee, 28, 35-37), but to clarify the entities underlying and

vdJ

associated with the Remax Elite dba: "The Plaintiff only wishes to clarify who the
underlying entity(ies) is/are that owned ReMax Elite when this action was originally
filed, by showing the underling entity(ies) and broker associated with ReMax Elite on the

..;)

pleading caption,, R. at 2326.
By clarifying that an actual brokerage had been doing business as Remax Elite: the
Plaintiffs sought "to abate the Defendants' 'defunct D/B/A' argument once and for all."
R. at 2321. Listing the brokerages and their principal broker would ensure that the
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Defendants could no longer object to the case being maintained under the name "Remax

Elite" and would "save the Court and the parties multitudinous hours of time by resolving
the D/B/A issue once and for all rather than continuing to file motion after motion on this
issue." R. at 2321.
In contrast, the Plaintiffs did not, as Cathy asserts, add Skip personally in an effort
to establish standing. Where the court had already ruled that Skip's brokerage had
standing under the principal-broker statute, the Brokerage amended its pleadings to put a
stop to the flood of filings based.on an already-decided issue, i.e., whether "Remax Elite"

as nothing more than a dba designation could maintain a lawsuit.
C.

The Brokerage's policy concerns are valid.

Cathy dismisses the Brokerage's policy concerns too lightly. These policy
concerns bolster the Brokerage's interpretation of Hooban and its argument that Skip is
involved in this case only as a representativ_e.
Indeed, where the Brokerage argues that -holding a broker personally liable under
his employer's contract would chill real estate transactions, Cathy's only response is that
brokers should purchase insurance or simply make sure they prevail in litigation. But this
ignores the reality that under Cathy's requested result brokers will not get involved in
recovering commissions unless forced to do so by the agent entitled to the commission,
thus spawning unnecessary and duplicative litigation. It also discounts the reality that
facing such liability will prevent many persons from becoming principal brokers in the
first place.
In short, Utah courts have good reason for not holding representatives personally
21

liable. If representatives-including principal brokers like Skip, trustees~ company
officers, guardians and conservators, etc.-face personal liability, those representatives
will stop participating in the legal system. And where those representatives receive no
personal benefit through litigation, to impose liability upon them, rather than upon their
principals, is incongruous and contrary to law.

D.

Cathy does not dispute that if Skip cannot benefit from the FSBO then
he should not be liable for attorney fees.
·····

..

..

-

Cathy ignores the Brokerage's argumennhat because Skip cannot benefit from the
FSBO he cannot be bound by the FSBO's attorney-fee provision. Br. of Appellee,

passim. Presumably Cathy ignores this argument because of her insistence that Skip will
benefit from the FSBO. But, as the trial court stated before amending its findings,
allowing Skip to recover attorney fees from one defendant while avoiding paying fees to
Cathy would be incongruous. R. at 7011.
The opposite is also true. Where the company Remax Elite-not Skip-is the only

party that can recover attorney fees under the FSBO, forcing any party other than Remax
Elite to pay attorney fees would be incongruous. Cathy has not responded to the assertion
that as a matter oflaw Skip cannot be liable under the FSBO if Skip cannot benefit from
theFSBO.

v.

Attorney Fees

If the Brokerage prevails on appeal, Cathy's request for attorney fees on appeal
must be denied. A party that does not prevail on appeal cannot recover fees on appeal.

Prince v. Bear River Mut. Jns. Co., 2002 UT 68, if156-59, 56 P.3d 524.

22

CONCLUSION

The judgment holding Skip personally liable for attorney fees must be reversed
because Skip was involved in this case as a representative only. Cathy has not shown
otherwise; her brief relies entirely on the mistaken assumption that Skip was involved in
this case in his personal capacity. But Skip has shown that he could not have sued in his
personal capacity, even if he wanted to.
Where the trial court ruled that Skip was_ not personally involved, the evidence
confirms that ruling, and the law does not allow Skip to be involved in this case
personally, Skip cannot ~e personally li~ble. To hold otherwise would elevate form over
substance, ignore basic contract law, and produce an inequitable result in this and future
cases.

DATED and SIGNED this 2nd day of September, 2015.
LEBARON & J ,NSEN, P.C.
~
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